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Codification on the Threshold of the Third Millennium 
 
 
Abstract. The core of codification is invariably the idea of a system in the law’s composition and 
structuring, doctrinal reflection and conceptual building up, including judicial reference to codal 
definitions as well. Or, codification is (1) an exclusive body of law (2) implementing unity in 
its regulatory field (3) with logical coherence and consequentiality. The dream of a common 
European codification penetrates into the very heart of the law, presupposing the unification of all 
the intellectuality and underlying approach that has ever distinguished Civil Law and Common 
Law. The more the advancement of the European unification progresses, the more inverse the 
assessment of European codification becomes, making us its past trends, values and regulatory 
techniques reconsidered. That is, as if we on the Continent had not so much become statal national 
units unified by a sequence of national laws but, being too conceited of our most promising 
collective heritage within the transitory phase of an infantile disorder, became rather fragmented 
in national isolation from one another, which now comes eventually to a final end.  
 
Keywords: codification & substitutes; objectification, systemicity, coherence, conceptuality of 
law; tradition, democratism in law; Civil Law & Common Law convergence; European Union 
 
 
What are the developments of the past quarter of a century in the field of codifi-
cation?1 The practice appears to have been following the already covered paths 
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 1 As antecedents, cf., from the author, Codification as a Socio-historical Phenomenon 
[in its original version in Hungarian, 1979]. Budapest, 1991. viii + 391 pp. and A 
kodifikáció és határai [Codification and its limits]. Állam és Igazgatás XXVIII (1978) 8–9, 
702–718 as well as, in a recent summary, Codification in The Philosophy of Law An 
Encyclopedia (ed. Gray, Ch. B.). New York & London, 1999. 120–122 [Garland Reference 
Library of the Humanities 1743]. Cf., as reviews on previously published chapters of the 
monograph, Gérard Conac in Revue internationale de Droit comparé 29 (1977) 861–862; 
M. A. Supataev in Sovetskoe gossudarstvo i pravo 1978/12, 148; in An Overview of 
Sociological Research in Hungary (ed. Szentes, T.), Budapest, 1978. 86; in Strane pravne 
zivot [Belgrade] (1978), No. 98, 26–28; Jörgen Dalberg-Larsen in Retfaerd [Copenhagen] 
(1978), No. 8, 86–93; Braun-Otto Bryde in Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches Privatrecht 
42 (1978) 3, 587–588; Heinz, K. E. in Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie LXV 
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undisturbedly, driven by its own impulse. At the same time, setting new targets 
by re-dreaming thousand-year-old European and commonly shared dreams in 
response to the present-day policies of the European Union, theory seems to be 
ready to revise, moreover, reverse earlier perspectives apparently thoroughly 
established and conventionalised, hoping to beat new paths now. Debating 
policies and methodologies in terms of codification is fashionable again: it is 
in the focus of discussions and its dilemmas appear as vital as regards our 
decisions on the future. 
 Considering the distinctive episodes of the recent past in terms of mere data, 
more than fifty codes have been promulgated since the end of the World War 
Two. The complete re-drafting of the classical civil codes in Portugal (1967), in 
the Netherlands (1992) and in Quebec (1994),2 of the penal codes in Spain 
(1995),3 in France and in Belgium, as well as the civil law re-codification in 
Louisiana, in Germany (for the law of contracts) and, in the Central and Eastern 
                                                      
(1979) 1, 146–148; María del Refugio González in Boletino Mexicano de Derecho 
Comparado XII (1979), 300–302; on the monograph in Hungarian, in Jogtudományi 
Közlöny XXXII (1977) 233–240; Rodríguez, F. E. in Boletino Mexicano de Derecho 
Comparado XII (1979) 672–673; Malonyai, P. in Magyar Nemzet XXXVI (1980) 199, 4; 
Visegrády, A. in Állam- és Jogtudomány XXIII (1980) 3, 534–539, Majoros, F. in Revue 
internationale de Droit comparé 32 (1980) 4, 873–876; Szabó, J. in Österreichische 
Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 32 (1981) 1, 123–128; Bianchi, L. in Právny Obzor 
[Bratislava] 64 (1981) 60–63; Sipos, S. in Universitate Babeş-Bolyai: Iurisprudentia [Cluj] 
26 (1981) 76–78; in Referativniy zhurnal po obshestvennie nauki Pravo [Moscow] 1981/4, 
26–29; Bónis, Gy. in Századok CXV (1981) 1325–1327; Nagy, E. in Állam és Igazgatás 
XXXII (1982) 506–514; Bolgár, V. in The American Journal of Comparative Law 30 
(1982), 698–703; Brunner, G. in Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches Privatrecht 46 (1982) 
579–580; Szabó, I. in Magyar Jog 30 (1983) and in his Ember és jog Jogelméleti 
tanulmányok [Man and law: studies in legal theory] Budapest, 1987. 94–106; on the 
monograph in English, Tallon, D. in Revue internationale de Droit comparé 44 (1992) 
740–741 and Legrand, P.: Strange Power of Words: Codification Situated. Tulane 
European & Civil Law Forum 9 (1994), 1–33. 
 2 Cf., e.g., Legrand, P.: De la profonde incivilité du Code Civil de Québec. 1–13 and 
Parent, S.: Le Code civil de Québec: incivilité ou opportunité. 15–25, both in: Revue inter-
disciplinaire d’Études juridiques (1996), No. 36. The fact that the doctrine, masterly 
deepened with exemplary accuracy, of the Civil Code was completed in practically the last 
moment of its effect–Quebec Civil Law An Introduction to Quebec Private Law (ed.: 
Brierley, J. E. C. & Macdonald, R. A.). Toronto, 1993. lviii + 728 pp.–, just to be replaced by 
an utterly new concept of codal implementation, indicates the defencelessness of mere 
theorising at all times. 
 3 Cf., e.g., Blanco, M. G.: Codification et droit de la postmodernité: La création du 
nouveau Code pénal espagnol de 1995. Droit et Société (1998) 509–534. 
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European region, in Russia (1996), and in preparation in Poland and Hungary 
(supplemented also by re-codification of criminal law in the latter), all represent 




First, in guise of general observation, a rather striking statement can be made. 
Notably, as the end of the second millennium was approaching, codification 
itself started increasingly to lose in purity and in the consistency of its classical 
ideals that once used to constitute a strict and coherent system. And this holds 
good of more than one aspects. On the one hand, the supremacy of statutory 
law with its function of exhaustively embodying the law gradually shows the 
signs of waning.5 On the other hand (and in result of the above), the requirement 
developed half a century ago as a logical perfection of the European ideal of 
codification, namely that a codificational determination of the law be main-
tained through re-drafting law-codes periodically recurrently, by keeping pace 
with changing historical, economic and social conditions given at any time, has 
itself weakened. (As is known, it is socialist codification having set itself the 
objective of the codal embodiment of the law that realised this requirement in 
the most principled way, purely and consequently, also as a pattern which later 
became, upon the pressure of the need for modernization, a model enthusiasti-
cally followed by the Afro–Asiatic developing countries as well.) 
 For practical considerations, this leap into the opposite extreme can be 
perceived as a pendulum-effect. From now on, it is not re-codification any longer 
but the utter negation of codification itself (i.e., the abandonment of codifi-
  
 4 Cf., e.g., Renaissance der Idee der Kodifikation Das neue niederländische Bürgerliche 
Gesetzbuch 1992. (hrsg.: Bydlinski, F.–Mayer-Maly, Th.–Pichler, J. W.). Wien–Köln–
Weimar, 1992. 157 pp. [Schriften zur Rechtspolitik 5]; Sacco, R.: Codificare: mode suprato 
di legifare? Rivista di diritto civile XXIX (1983) 1, 117 et seq., specially at 120; as well 
as Zweigert, K.–Puttfarken, H.-J.: Allgemeines und besonderes zur Kodifikation. In 
Festschrift für Imre Zajtay (hrsg. Graveson, R. H.). Tübingen, 1982. 569 et seq. 
 5 According to Kübler, F.: Kodifikation und Demokratie. Juristenzeitung (1969), 645 
et seq., especially at 651, the crisis of the law in general is “nothing but normal in a 
democratic industrial society [where] the fragmentary and periodical character of the statute 
is a part of the ordinary state of affairs”. A similar view can be found in, e.g., Esser, J.: 
Gesetzesrationalität im Kodifikationszeitalter und heute. In: 100 Jahre oberste deutsche 
Justizbehörde Vom Reichjustizamt zum Bundesministerium der Justiz (hrsg. Vogel, H. J.–
Esser, J.). Tübingen, 1977. 13 et seq. [Recht und Staat in Geschichte und Gegenwart 470]. 
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cation in order to reach a state of “de-codification”6) that comes to the 
forefront more and more forcefully as a new landmark. More precisely, the 
emphasis is increasingly shifting from the code itself to the actual filling of one-
time codal functions. In other words, the systemic form of objectivation of the 
law suitable to provide a gapless response to any question at will within its field 
of regulation seems to be eventually substituted by the actuality of whatever 
reply only channelled by the code, maybe by providing nothing but systemic 
or taxonomic loci to which, conceptually or institutionally, the freely 
contextualisable judicial stand may refer.7 According to the new mainstream 
opinion, regarded as exclusively justified by the ideologies of postmodernity, 
the alleged “authoritarianism of codification” of the past will have to yield its 
place (both as an ideal and as the technique of regulatory practice) to a kind of 
“democratic openness”,8 in pursuance to some development typologies mostly 
rooted in American experience but increasingly generalised so as to include 
European practices as well.9 
  
 6 Irti, N.: L’età della decodificazione. 3rd ed. Milano, 1989. 195. 
 7 According to the expression of Sacco, 125, it is no longer the code-form that is 
superior but the idea of its (suit)ability to offer a solution: “Il codice non è […] superato. È 
superata l’idea che un codice possa nascere privo di lacune, e che la sua sola lettera possa 
offrire une buone soluzione per tutti i possibili casi del futuro.” 
 8 According to Kübler, p. 651, there is a “change of the authoritarian codification state 
towards a system aiming at democratic openness where legislation has become a political 
instrument of a permanently required adjustment” in progress. According to Lasserre-
Kiesow, V. : La codification en Allemande au XVIII
e 
siècle: Réflexions sur la codification 
d’hier et d’aujourd’hui. Archives de Philosophie du Droit 42 (1998), 215–231, quotation 
on 223 and 231, “the future is no longer to be found in the past. [...] [C]odification based 
on paradigms of statism as well as on perfection of form and contents certainly does not 
have any future any longer.” 
 9 See, as a first formulation, from the author, Átalakulóban a jog? [Law in trans-
formation?] Állam- és Jogtudomány XXIII (1980) 4, 670–680 and Logic of Law and 
Judicial Activity: A Gap between Ideals, Reality, and Future Perspectives. In: Legal 
Development and Comparative Law (ed. Péteri, Z.–Lamm, V.). Budapest, 1981. 45–76, 
particularly para. 5, as inspired by Wasserstrom, R. A.: The Judicial Decision Toward a 
Theory of Legal Justification. Stanford, 1961. 122 et seq.; Per Olof Bolding Reliance on 
Authorities or Open Debate? Two Models of Legal Argumentation. Scandinavian Studies 
in Law 13 (Stockholm, 1969), 65 et seq.; Mangabeira Unger, R.: Law in Modern Society 
Toward a Criticism of Social Theory. New York–London, 1976, ch. II; and, especially, 
Nonet, Ph.–Selznick, Ph.: Law and Society in Transition Toward Responsive Law.  New 
York, 1978. 
 CODIFICATION ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE THIRD MILLENNIUM 93 
  
 
 As a logical consequence to this, present-day legislators tend to leave behind 
all former endeavours for systemic purity and consistency (as if these were 
nothing but instances of a kind of doctrinarian atavism), only to make way for 
the pragmatism of borrowing from just anywhere, and thereby accepting both 
the partialness and fragmentation of results.10 In addition to all these, a new 
kind of localism, transitionalism and pragmatism making headway under the 
aegis of globalism rapidly gaining ground, explain the attempt at absolutising 
currently ongoing endeavours with the wish to also re-write the past (a practice 
far from unfamiliar in France of the earlier days). Notably, a paradigmatic shift 
is at stake as a tendency becoming more and more general, in terms of which 
the codification once completed by Napoleon and also its magnificent and lasting 
type-framing features seem nowadays to be swept out of collective memory 
and taken notice of, if at all, rather as a historically incidental exception in 
the birthplace of classical codification, only to relativise the very term 
‘codification’ (along with the idea and the historical achievement repre-
sented by its one-time realisation), by reducing its meaning to the practice of 
rationalising one aspect of the mass-scale and all-inclusive management implied 
by today’s public administration, that is, to the continuous consolidation of its 
legal normative staff (from statutes to governmental decrees, including also 
administrative regulations).11 
 This short-sighted and extreme simplification (forecasting “the end of history” 
with all the a-historical conceptual misrepresentation inherent in Francis 
Fukuyama’s contemporary Utopianism)–in addition to its rather controversial 
nature, as such a ‘codification’, taken as the genuine piece of consolidation, 
  
 10 According to Bergel, J.-L.: Les méthodes de codification dans les pays de droit mixte. 
In La formation du droit national dans les pays de droit mixte. Aix-Marseille, 1989. 21–34, 
“from now on, there is nothing but mixed laws” (34), because “the mixed character grows 
widespread by becoming the general rule” (35). 
 11 As a vice-president of the National Committee for Codification, Braibant, G.: 
Codification. In Encyclopaedia Universalis 6, Paris, 1995. 9–42 has visualised today’s 
practice, drowned in everyday hygiene and poorly lacking any concept, as the great 
universal achievement of mankind. Because, although “codification has been an ancient 
dream of mankind” (39), yet its manifestations “hardly have more value than the texts 
adopted or issued by them”. Namely, “codification itself is nothing else than the operation 
or policy of the fabrication of codes, through re-arranging former norms or creating new 
norms” (39). Accordingly, the term ‘codification’ itself has a twofold meaning. True, there was 
once also “a great work of codification”, the Code civil, yet, today also “systematic codes” 
are available to us. For,  as he goes on, “the renaissance [of codification] took place after 
the [Second World] War” (40). 
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has to first “transcript”, then “transgress” the positivated legal staff processed 
by it, tearing this staff out from its original texture, by placing it into another 
context, and thereby finally “transdict” it12–is not only sheer “conceptual 
abuse”13 but is obviously indicative of decline, too.14 All this slowly starts to 
characterise our age to an extent that some observers believe to discover 
exactly opposite, counter-running tendencies among the trends in the United 
States of America and in the European Union, pointing out that while there 
the re-assertion or the launch of codification, here, on our continent, de-
codification has been put on the agenda.15 
 A kind of scepticism has become general–first, in the form of disillusion-
ment and then, as a general awakening, due to the vanishing of the myths of 
the European ideal of codification16–which, as extended also to the past, has 
gradually but surely been transferred from the loss of confidence placed in 
the regulatory force of and normative foresight by the law, to the general 
disappointment in codification itself. Some present-day sober explanations 
  
 12 Terms by Timsit, G.: La codification: transcription ou transgression de la loi? In his 
Archipel de la norme. Paris, 1997. ch. V, 145–159, especially at 151, 155 and also 159. 
Actually, Timsit speaks about consolidation, yet, indicative of uninhibited actualisation, he 
terms it codification all along [as done also by both Catta, E.: Codification et la loi fétiche. 
In Interpréter le droit Le sens, l’interprête, la machine (dir. Thomasset, C.–Bourcier, D.). 
Bruxelles, 1997. 63–69 and de Bèchillon, D.: L’imaginaire d’un code. Droits (1998), No. 
27: La codification 3, 173–184], and blames it basically for “transcendence of the limits of 
the law” (151) and for “a mummification of the law” (159), that is, for the fact that exactly 
this false codification, operating with original sources of the law, falsifies them 
unpronouncedly, because it re-positivates them in a new context and medium. 
 13 This conceptual extension is expressly considered as an abuse by, e.g., Gaurieu, D.: 
La rédaction des normes juridiques, source de la métamorphose du droit? Quelques repères 
historiques pour une réflexion contemporaine. Revue générale de droit 31 (2001) 1–85. 
 14 Having apparently passed the great moments of codification once and for all 
(accompanied by the gradual erosion of the belief in rational plannability and in any 
Gesamtplan’s logical executability, in addition to the lack of appropriate political and legal 
circumstances) may perhaps account for the fact that “The importance of codes will 
decrease, and the drafting of truly new ones–capturing and organizing new realities–will 
be, at least for the moment, an almost impossible task.” Damaska, M.: On Circumstances 
Favoring Codification. Revista Jurídica de la Universidad de Puerto Rico LII (1983) 355–
371, quotation on 370. 
 15 Shael H.: The Fate and the Future of Codification in America. In: Essays on 
European Law and Israel (ed. Rabello, A. M.). Jerusalem, 1996. 89–129, especially 124.  
 16 E.g., Arnaud, A.-J.: Pour une pensée juridique européenne. Paris, 1991. 294 [Les 
voies du droit] speaks about “reassuring, alleviating myths of the simplicity, permanence 
and abstract character of the law”. 
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trace this back to the expectations over-intensified yet puristic (and, in this regard, 
also doctrinarian), thus excessive all through (and, therefore, impractical, 
consequently proving unsuitable to stand the test of time), fixed back in the 
age of the Enlightenment, of the birth of classical codification.17 This is the 
recognition from which immediately a consequence is also drawn, according to 
which only the kind of codification could prove successful with lasting effects 
and applicable in the long run, where its drafters were the least inclined to 
over-enthusiasm.18 We seem to have left behind once and for all, as the one-
time children’s room of our (post)modernity, the claim for codifying the law 
with the intent of “establishing a new unified legal system”, and we are going 
only to draw on codification in as much as it is inevitable “to safeguard the 
interests of the community by restricting, as far as possible, the political aspects 
and influence of different lobbyists”,19 not excluding out the possibility either 
that the instrument of classical codification will one day be replaced by artificial 




Well, what is codification like and where is it heading at the threshold of the 
new millennium? Most responses seem to confirm my earlier monographic 
  
 17 E.g., Schmidt, K.: Die Zukunft der Kodifikationsidee Rechtsprechung, Wissenschaft und 
Gesetzgebung vor den Gesetzeswerken des geltenden Rechts. Heidelberg, 1985. 79. 
[Juristische Studiengesellschaft “Karlsruhe” 167]. 
 18 “The reason why in Countries with old Civil Codes the courts are still able to find 
their way lies in the fact that legislators did not attempt too much.” Lorenz, W.: On the 
»Calling« of Our Time for Civil Legislation. In: Questions of Civil Law Codification (ed.  
Harmathy A.–Németh Á.). Budapest, 1990. 128. 
 19 Kötz, H.: Schuldrechtsüberarbeitung und Kodifikationsprinzip. In: Festschrift für 
Wolfram Müller-Freienfels (hrsg. Dieckmann, A. et al.). Baden-Baden, 1986. 97 and, for 
contrasting past and future, cf. also Harmathy, A.: Codification in a Period of Transition. 
U[niversity of]C[alifornia] Davis Law Review 31 (Spring 1998) 783–798, quotation on 
789. It is worthwhile to notice the irony inherent in the fact that the image of the past 
formed by such prominent civilian authors about codification, taken once as a creative 
power, is nothing else than the image of future major expectations formed within the 
European Union. Or, this is a proof that even if history does not repeat itself, we do 
ourselves. Thanks to our urge to adapt, we again and again draw on the past, its experiences 
and instrumentalities. 
 20 “The arduous road to new integration will probably be paved by artificial intelligence 
better able to detect patterns in the complexity of the modern social life.” Damaska: ibid. 
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stand,21 which is found by certain dreamers of our future as something hopelessly 
embedded in (as formed by) the ideals of the past, therefore statist, and, as to 
declare what the law is, authoritarian; or, and briefly, atavistic and, as such, 
to be transcended. In sharp contrast with this, there is only an elastic, wishful 
image formed about the character of the future European civil code, vaguely 
sketched with exploratory uncertainty, far from being discernible in any 
aspect. 
 According to the theoretical literature (leaving, at the moment, the 
deconstructive reconstructions of the near future out of account), the core of 
codification is still the idea of a system manifested in both its composition 
and structuring, doctrinal reflection and conceptual building up, including the 
judicial practice of referring to codal definitions of institutions, legal constructs 
and dispositions as well:22 
 
“Putting an end to the rule of the fuzzy and uncertain, wrongly cut boundaries 
and of the only approximate classifications, by applying definite cuts and 
creating sharp boundaries, replacing the former by setting up clear classes.”23 
 
Or, codification invariably appears (1) as an exclusive body of law, (2) imple-
menting unity in its regulatory field (3) with logical coherence and 
consequentiality;24 or, showing the features of (1) completeness, (2) freedom 
  
 21 Cf., Varga Codification…, passim. 
 22 See, first of all (though tacitly admitting to be unable to comprehend the entire 
continental approach to law beyond the separation of what is systemic and what is non-
systemic), Freeman, M. D. A.: The Concept of Codification. The Jewish Law Annual 2 
(1979), 168–179, especially at 169. For the development in history of the concepts ‘system’ 
and ‘legal system’, see, from Sève, R.: Introduction. 1–10, and, for their analysis by 
example of the Code civil, his Système et code. 22–86, both in Archives de Philosophie du 
Droit 31: Le système juridique (1986). 
 23 Bourdieu, P.: Habitus, code et codification. Actes de la recherche en siences sociales 
(1986), 4–44, quotation on 42, claiming that the “the system is built on […] cognition as 
universal, through the inseparably logical and ethical necessity of it” (4). 
 24 Humbert, H.: Les XII Tables, une codification? Droits (1998) La codification 3, 87–
112, applies the collective incidence of all these characteristics to qualify the lex duodecim 
tabularum as a code (110–111). According to Arnaud, 135, codification is a “coherent and 
systematic regulation” achieved through “exhaustive totalisation” which, according to R. 
C. van Caenegem An Historical Introduction to Private Law. Cambridge, 1992), especially 
at 12, denotes ”a general, exhaustive regulation of a particular area of law”, by “involving 
a coherent programme and a consistent logical structure”. 
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from contradictions and (3) regulatory economy;25 or, furthermore, of a (1) 
comprehensive and (2) systematic (3) enactment by the legislature,26 (4) 
promulgated as a code.27 The theoretical attitude is conservative here: once the 
paths of the mere collection and textual embodiment of laws, once termed by 
me then as the quantitative,  and later on, the systemic reshaping of the law 
according to the logical ideal of a system, termed by me then as the qualitative,  
types of codification have started to diverge, also the notion implied by the 
terms ‘code’ and ‘codification’ has become reduced to mean just the latter, that 
is, the qualitative type, carrying, as a sine qua non, the criterion of systemicity 
regarding the law processed all through. 
 Well, it is exactly this differentiation that seems to be disappearing as an 
outdated past achievement from the postmodernist visions of the political 
voluntarism of the European Union, not yet equipped with any encouraging 
practical experience in an all-comprehensive codificatory regulation. 
 The first guinea pig for experimentation in this immense ongoing endeavour 
is the effort at elaborating, one way or another, the codification of private law 
of the European Union. For the time being, we know less about the underlying 
motives and perspectives of common European legislation (including the 
  
 25 Ost, F.: Le code et le dictionnaire: Acceptabilité linguistique et validité juridique. 
Sociologie et sociétés XVIII (avril 1986) 59–75. 
 26 Zimmermann, R.: Codification: History and Present Signification of an Idea. European 
Review of Private Law 8 (1995) 95–120, especially 96–97. van Caenegem, R. C.: Judges, 
Legislators & Professors Chapters in European Legal History [Goodhart Lectures 1984–
1985] Cambridge, 1987. on 42 defines the code as a comprehensive and systematic exposition 
replacing all previous laws in a new text promulgated as a law. Dölemayer, B.: 
Zivilrechtliche Kodifikationen in Europa im 19. Jahrhundert. In Evolution of the Judicial 
Law in XIXth Century ed. Grzegorz Górski {= Law in History [Lublin] 1 (2000)}, 117–130, 
on 118 identifies it simply as the “materially comprehensive, systematic, abstract and rational 
regulation of an entire area of law summarised in a code (codex)” [“materiell umfassenden, 
systematischen, abstrakten und rationalen Regelung eines ganzen Rechtsgebiets in einem 
Gesetzbuch (codex)”]. 
 27 Of course, there are softer definitions as well. According to Ascarelli, T.: L’idea di 
codice nel diritto privato e la funzione dell’interpretazione. [1955] In his Saggi giuridici 
(Milano, 1949), 48–49, for instance, “The code is characterised by a claim to construct a 
»new«, »complete«, and »definitive« legal order that includes amongst its formulations 
solutions for all possible cases”, and, as stated by Pio Caroni Lecciones catalanas sobre la 
historia de la codificación [Lezioni catalane sulla storia della codificazione] (Madrid, 
1996), 177, especially at 22–23 [Publicaciones del Seminario de Historia del Derecho de 
Barcelona 1], the code is a “written presentation aiming at plenitude, with a unificatory 
function”. 
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clarification of the theoretical foundations and necessity of a systematic 
codification), reminiscent of the classical period of drafting constitutions and 
law-codes as well, than about the nature of “democratism” characterised by 
constant hesitation and the easy readiness to launch the bureaucratic machinery 
of common legislation in motion. No doubt, the dilemmas regarding the legal 
expression of the foundation of national states in the 18th to 19th centuries will 
gain new aspects in the current rush for the foundation of a truly inter-national 
state. Therefore, I still find the lessons drawn two centuries ago invariably 
remarkable, according to which “codes and constitutions have performed 
analogous institutional roles” in the legal performance of the political and 
civil foundation of a society, as supporting and complementing one another in 
the historically parallel rush for providing basic chartae and law-books.28 
 Well, returning to the issues pertaining to the common European codification, 
all we could experience about its outlines so far is that 
 – it does not aim at abstract conceptual clarity, consistence or exclusive 
pursuance of any ideal or actual model:29 it will presumably represent the 
entire European and even all-Atlantic heritage in the tradition of values and 
techniques as a practical whole in a (perhaps even mosaic-like) new quality. 
At the same time, 
 – it does not aim at perfection, nor at any exclusive completeness.30 As 
the result of a new definition of the law, it will have to openly accept, in 
the context of constantly changing interests and depending on the institu-
tional moves at any given time, a sheerly temporary and mediatory role. 
Therefore, having drawn the lesson from the failures of codification up to 
now, 
 – it can be nothing more than just “creeping”.31 As soon as this figurative 
expression has reached consensus among the students of law taking part 
  
 28 Gambaro, A.: Codes and Constitutions in Civil Law. In: Italian Studies in Law 2, 
(ed.: Pizzorusso, A.). Dordrecht–Boston–London, 1994. 79–104, quotation on 79. 
 29 Basedow, J.: Codification of Private Law in the European Union: The Making of a 
Hybrid. European Review of Private Law 9 (2001) 35–49. 
 30 According to Lasserre-Kiesow, what once, in the period of classical codification, 
embodied “the totalisation of knowledge” (221), is nothing else on the final analysis than 
“a patriotic and habitual juridical exaggeration […] which only hinders the ideal of a legal 
Europe” (223). In a similar sense, see also Wiegand, W.: Back to the Future? Rechts-
historisches Journal (1993) 283. 
 31 The term ‘to creep’ denoting ‘to develop slowly and steadily […] in the hope of 
advancement’ was first used by Klaus Peter Berger The Creeping Codification of the Lex 
Mercatoria. The Hague, 1999. 
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in the debate (revealing also the poet, dreamer, innovator and/or social 
revolutionary hidden in each of us even if mostly suppressed by our scholarly 
discipline), the doctrinal (and maybe dry, yet systematic) reasoning of 
treatises in jurisprudence has become substituted (in a way unheard of in 
juridical literature at earlier times) by a rhapsodic subjectivism with lists of 
desires and the boundlessness (almost reminiscent of the ecstasy of the so-
called ‘honeymoon-period’, characteristic of early modern and modern 
revolutions), even unrestraint and randomness, of a credo of “Anything is 
possible, because by virtue of the power of such a giant club, we are in a 
position to target anything at will!”. 
 Accordingly, some keep day-dreaming hoping that a kind of the desired 
end-result will after all emerge one way or another, in one form or another, 
upon the pattern and with the automatism of the ‘Volksgeist’ once active in 
SAVIGNY’s thought, due to the emerging clarification of principles through 
their continuous testing in practice, their unfatiguing re-consideration and 
adjustments, combining the effect of scholarship and doctrine with the 
socialising force of living practice and the educational efforts available 
through general and vocational training.32 According to other opinions, the 
desired unity of the European Union can, at most, emerge as the result of 
endeavours, in which the accumulation of principles (to be further shaped, 
re-asserted and represented all through by a truly inter-national European 
legal profession, capable of rising above national fragmentation) will be 
conceived in the womb of common European professional education and 
business practice, with a unifying legal scholarship and doctrine in the 
background. Therefore, it is practicality what the new European creed calls 
for and not pure scientism or self-complacent authorial egoism; for the latter 
can merely lead to selfishness, yielding only unnecessary complexity and 
contradiction, i.e., abstract and doctrinaire conceptuality which, as dried-
out and lifeless fruits, cannot genuinely respond to the present, truly practical 
challenge. Or, new Portalises are needed, since only the humility of traditions 
can provide bases for a codification achieved at the level of foundational 
principles.33 Among the authorial convictions, it seems to be a bit too 
daring to dream farther about (reminiscently, first of all, of the patterns offered 
by the American Restatement of the Law and the uniform legislation) 
  
 32 Bergerm K. P.: The Principles of European Contract Law and the Concept of 
»Creeping Codification« of Law. European Review of Private Law 9 (2001) 21–34. 
 33 Lando, O.: Some Features of the Law of Contract in the Third Millennium. 
Scandinavian Studies in Law 40, Stockholm, 2000. 343–402, especially 361–363. 
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experimental preparation of such projects as the Principles of European 
Contract Law or of European Civil Procedure, so as to be able to decide, 
given the newly acquired practical experience, how to go on (if one will be 
decided to go further at all);34 or, partly preconceiving the response, leave 
the consummation of the codifying process to legal practice from the 
outset, whose result appearing some time in future can, of course, be 
applied to further refine either the normative material itself or any of its 
official commentaries.35 No matter how the European legal profession may 
decide, we have to be aware of the fact that even in case any codification is 
eventually completed, “It could then take decades before today’s level of 
predictability and rationality of decisions would be reached again.”36 At the 
same time and in an evident interrelation with this, 
 – the question of the future duality and/or eventual convergence of the 
British Common Law and the continental Civil Law is still raised as a vital 
issue.37 This old-new question (earlier only a favourite delicacy for legal 
  
 34 Hondius, E.: Towards a European Civil Code. In: Towards a European Civil Code 
ed. Arthur Hartkamp, 2nd ed. Nijmegen–The Hague–Boston, 1998. 3–19. 
 35 As formulated by Schmid, Ch. U.: Legitimacy Conditions for a European Civil 
Code. Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 8 (2001) 277–298, on 296, 
there will be an “integrative Restatement with a common European commentary section”, 
onto which–more and more acceptedly anyway in West-European practice [cf., e.g., 
Schulze, R.: Vergleichende Gesetzauslegung und Rechtsangleichung. Zeitschrift für 
Rechtsvergleichung, internationales Privatrecht und Europarecht (1997), 183 et seq. and 
Monateri, G.–Somma, A.: »Alien in Rome«: L’uso del diritto comparato come inter-
pretazione analogica ex art. 12 preleggi. Il Foro Italiano (1999), V47]–a so-called comparative 
interpretation is going to be built. Although this seems to contradict the established practice 
according to which, from the very beginning, a “Cartesian style” has been dominant in the 
exclusive European judicial forum properly designed so far, i.e., the European Court of 
Justice, which is allegedly “inspired by the French tradition, in which judgments are more 
set up as binding conclusions of a quasi-scientific nature than justified argumentatively” 
[cf., e.g., Weiler, J. H. H.: The Function and Future of European Law. In: Function and 
Future of European Law (ed. Heiskanen, V.–Kulovesi, K.). Helsinki, 1999. 17 et seq. and 
Leible, S.: Rolle der Rechtsprechung des EuGH bei der europäischen Privatrechtsent-
wicklung. In: Auf dem Wege zu einem Europäischen Zivilgesetzbuch (hrsg. Martiny, D.–
Witzleb, N.). Berlin, 1999. 55 et seq. and 73 et seq. [Schriftenreihe der Juristischen 
Fakultät der Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt]. This is a practice that will, if not 
accompanied by a total shift in character, be downright inoperable in a kind of regulation 
carried out mostly on the level of mere principles. 
 36 Schmid: op. cit. 287. 
 37 The Clifford Chance Millennium Lectures The Coming together of the Common Law 
and the Civil Law (ed. Markesinis, B. S.). Oxford–Portland, 2000. and, in it, especially 
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comparatists in generating intellectual pleasures) has now become, from the 
vague presentiment of the presumable consequences of a political resolution, 
the sine qua non of such a resolution and its feasible future realisation. For 
the common European administration of justice as practised in Luxembourg, 
Strasbourg, etc. for a few decades now has only required the commonality 
of results, with no relevance to the issue how these have been actually 
reached, with which ways and what procedures resorted to and which sources 
referred to in the process. However, a common European codification, 
contemplated now, already penetrates straight into the heart of the law. It 
presupposes the unification of all the intellectuality and underlying approach, 
conceptual thinking, subordination to logical and systemic forms (that is, 
sensitivity, skills and styles) which, on their turn and throughout the sequence 
of centuries, not only offered our continent a scope of law-positivations 
diverging in nature from those on the British Isles but, so to say, embodied 
a route and direction diametrically opposite to the hopes placed in this 
converging European future, both in the historical experiences and their 
scholarly reconstruction, in the conceptual and methodological frameworks 
of political and constitutional thinking, in the stake and nature of philoso-
phising–or, in sum, in taking the choice between the pragmatic reliance on 
human and social experience or the mere pursuance of the barren logic of 
preconceived conceptual schemes, and, thereby, also between the empirical 
(inductive) and the principled and methodical (deductive) ways of construc-
tion–from the one-time accomplishment of the entire revolution in natural 
scientific thought.38 
 Or, to put it briefly, quite simply and also professionally simplified: those 
of us who, ready for action, await orders to carry them out, or those who, 
attending to each other benevolently, hope the diligent acts of the detail 
work (invisible in the humane everyday responsible practice) to produce 
                                                      
Markesinis, B. S.: Our Debt to Europe: Past, Present, and Future. 37–66; Crosswald 
Curran, V.: Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal Uniformity and the 
Homogenization of the European Union. The Columbia Journal of European Law 7 (2001) 
63–126. One of the authors [Helmholtz, R. H.: Continental Law and Common Law: 
Historical Strangers or Companions? Duke Law Journal (1990) 1207–1228] remarks in 
conclusion (on 1228) that “Common lawyers always wished to avoid some aspects of 
Continental law, but they also habitually regarded it as a companion and resource to be 
called upon in need, not as a stranger.” 
 38 For the differing mentality, cf., from the author, Lectures on the Paradigms of 
Legal Thinking. Budapest, 1999. and Összehasonlító jogi kultúrák? [Comparative legal 
cultures?]. Jogtudományi Közlöny LVI (2001) 409–416. 
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the long desired result one day, can, at the highest, be specialists of 
comparative law in their entrenchment into legal texts, but by no means 
historically and anthropologically sensitive thinkers who have, at the same 
time, to bear in mind the essentials of comparative legal cultures as well.39 
For the latter are those who already know (or, at least presume at the level 
of hypothesis substantiating their approach and explorations) that law is not 
simply a mechanism built up of interchangeable parts, according to a product-
type and operated as a machine, but an aspect of living human culture, 
separated relatively and only for professional purposes from the other factors 
and bearers of the order in making at a community level, only to be able 
with foreseeable security (as having stepped out from the everyday circulation 
of interests) to direct, influence and control the practice of conflict-resolution 
according to ready-made patterns, as the case may be, thereby also 
rendering it impersonal in the spirit of the ethos of the order itself, that is, an 
external Order which is, like the veil of Justitia, necessarily depersonalised. 
 (As a matter of fact, we can by far not be sure whether or not at all, and 
in which sense, the Anglo–American legal mentality may mean indeed 
‘rule’ by ‘law’. For instance, the early failure of the reformist effort by the 
British Law Commission (aimed at considering codification as late as in 
1964) was indicative of an utter confusion as to the generalisability of the 
law as broken into and embodied by a series of concepts, as well as its 
arrangement and ordination according to abstract logical forms, with the 
implied possibility of also subordinating (subsuming) facts to rules.40 For in 
  
 39 For their conceptual and disciplinary separation and the requirements of the new 
approach, see, from the author, Comparative Legal Cultures: Attempts at Conceptualization. 
Acta Juridica Hungarica 38 (1997) 53–63 and Comparative Legal Cultures?, passim, 
pondering upon the topic covered by Comparative Legal Cultures (ed. & introd. Varga, 
Cs.). Hong Kong–Singapore–Sydney–New York, 1992. [The International Library of 
Essays in Law and Legal Theory: Legal Cultures 1.] and European Legal Cultures (ed. 
Gessner, V.–Hoeland, A.–Varga, Cs.). Aldershot–Brookfield USA–Singapore–Sydney, 
1996) xviii + 567 pp. [Tempus Textbook Series on European Law and European Legal 
Cultures I]. 
 40 The effort of Jeremy Bentham–“The unity of a law will depend upon the unity of the 
species of the act which is the object of it” [in his Of Laws in General (ed. Hart, H. L. A.). 
London, 1970. 166.]–was reasserted to ordain the proper obligation or empowerment to 
each and every behavioural situation as a ‘law/right’ befitting it; Jolowicz’ whole venture 
[The Division and Classification of the Law (ed. Jolowicz, J. A.). London, 1970.] set itself 
the aim of replacing this benthamite dependence on acts by a dependence on social facts; 
while Julius Stone pointed out, [in his Legal System and Lawyers’ Reasonings. London, 
1964. 269.] that even the most elementary natural facts (like, e.g., the rotting scrap of a 
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their codificatory thought, the Britons used to maintain that if law were 
traced back to a (re)posited series of rules at all, that what would be most 
meaningful of all this settlement for the judges could only be the rather 
informal reasoning based upon the travaux préparatoires, indeed worthy of 
the human intellect. And this is exactly what the 19th-century British-Indian 
codifier wanted to express when he remembered as follows: “we added as 
many illustrations as we thought necessary for the purpose of explaining 
it”, and, therefore, it would be most beneficial to include these rules’ grounds 
along with the rules themselves into such codes.41 Well, they were actually, 
then and now, trying to beat a path lagging centuries behind Leibniz’ age 
and recognitions. Actually, the very idea of codification arises from the 
theoretical understanding that codal law cannot indeed be anything else 
than a sheer sequence of abstract and general rules, while the underlying 
understanding of the common law is still related with the idea of something 
that can exclusively be grasped empirically, placed somewhere between the 
casual decision and the grounds for decision, equally drawn from tradition.) 
 
Even just a glance through the literature pouring in this topic is enough to see 
that there are already painstaking case studies about the intensifying “Europeani-
sation” of the British jurisprudence42 and all those “myths of codification”–
according to which, to make mention of just one formulation, 
 
“I. A codification can provide an accessible and complete formulation of the 
law and can enable the development of the law in a planned manner. II. Codal 
                                                      
snail found in the beverage, as referred to in Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562), may 
mean “dead snails, or any snails, or any noxious physical foreign body, or any noxious 
foreign element, physical or not, or any noxious element”; as other authors [Twining–
O’Donovan–Paliwala: Ernie and the Centipede. In: The Division...] have also ventured to 
prove that “a black female poodle puppy can be classified by colour, sex, species or age”. 
Freeman: op. cit. 172–173. 
 41 Black v. Clawson [1975] A.C. 591; Macaulay’s letter to Lord Auckland, quoted by 
Farrar, J.: Law Reform and the Law Commission. London, 1974. 58–59; F. Vaughan 
Hawkins in Juridical Society Papers 3 (1865), 110 et seq., especially at 112; as well as 
Farrar: 159. Quotation by Freeman: op. cit. 176–177. 
 42 E.g., Zimmermann, R.: Der europäische Charakter des englischen Rechts: Historische 
Verbindungen zwischen civil law and common law. Zeitschrift für Europäisches Recht I 
(1993), 4 et seq.; Levitsky, J.: The Europeanization of the British Legal Style. The 
American Journal of Comparative Law 42 (1994), 347 et seq. 
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regimes are rigid and not adaptable. III. The common law’s emphasis on case 
law techniques makes it admirably adaptable to new circumstances.”43 
 
–which, of course, as dreams and Utopian expectations, can be justified neither 
in the domain of Civil Law, nor that of Common Law. It may seem paradoxical, 
yet it is a truth worth considering that even, for instance, French law is more 
flexible, more suitable for practical adaptation and fertilising application from 
many aspects, than case-law directly made by judges. After all, the continental 
law-applying process steps out from general principles calling, by their nature, 
for interpretation, and it may initiate debate on the meaning and applicability 
of rules independently from the question of the very existence and systemically 
co-ordinated arrangement of the same rules, as opposed to English judge-made 
law reduced to an amalgam(ate) of casual decisions, which, like “an amorphous 
mass […] [in which] there is no organizing principle”,44 directly carries on 
(because of the undifferentiated unity of the rules and their casual application) 
the legal character and self-identity of the whole, up to its last component as 
well.45 Well, expectations linking positive or negative Utopianism to codification 
  
 43 Markesinis: B. A.: The Destructive and Constructive Role of the Comparative Lawyer. 
[originally in Rabels Zeitschrift (1993), 438–448] in his Foreign Law and Comparative 
Methodology A Subject and a Thesis. Oxford, 1997. 36–46, quotation on 37–38. 
 44 Watson, A.: The Importance of »Nutshells«. The American Journal of Comparative 
Law 42 (1994), 1–23, quotation on 11 and 12. 
 45 See Tunc, A.: Codification: The French Experience. In: Problems of Codification 
(ed.: Stoljar, S. J.). Canberra, 1977. 73–74, as well as David, R.: French Law Its Structure, 
Sources, and Methodology. Baton Rouge, 1972. xviii + 222 pp., especially at 80 and 83. 
 It is to be noted that this is the line by which the question of the general part of civil 
codes becomes directly a regulatory problem of codification–as it defines, in principle, the 
upper layer of normative axiomatism (without which the “lawyer at sea in the law like a 
pilot without a compass” would helplessly roam [cf. Unger System des österreichischen 
allgemeinen Privatrechts I, 5th ed. (1892), 641, as well as Zweigert, K.–Kötz, H.: Intro-
duction to Comparative Law I: The Framework, 2nd rev. ed. (trans.: Weir, T.). Oxford, 
1987. 167]–, as well as the gap-filling technique of the Swiss Zivilgesetzbuch, commissioning 
the judge to become eventually an accidental substitute to the legislator (§ 1), the specific 
feature of which lays not only in the fact that it can be traced back via Kant even to 
Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, 1137b) but it also reasserts the continental regulatory 
principle (the judicial empowerment notwithstanding), by eventually declaring that “in 
order to be legal a decision must be based on a rule which can be formulated as a general 
one” [Wieacker, F.: A History of Private Law in Europe With Particular Reference to 
Germany {Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit, 1952, 2nd ed. rev. 1967} (trans. Weir, T.). 
Oxford, 1995. 391]. 
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mostly appear mixed with manifestations of either the euphoric belief in a 
Common Europe46 or, just to the contrary, an extremist rejection of it.47 Any 
analysis of the signs, steps and events of actual rapprochement (or, at least, of 
effective interaction and mutual influence) is relatively rare a phenomenon. 
For instance, in Germany, the jurisprudence of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch has 
arrived from the one-time exegesis reached as a “juristic game of chess” to a 
“case-law revolution”,48 while in the English legal thought, there is emerging an 
“increased self-assertion of a kind of doctrinarism” (as a feature indicating that 
  
 46 Markesinis, B.: The Gradual Convergence Foreign Ideas, Foreign Influences and 
English Law on the Eve of the 21st Century. Oxford, 1994.; Gordley, J.: Common Law and 
Civil Law: Eine überholte Unterscheidung. Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht I 
(1993), 498 et seq. 
 47 Cf., e.g., from Legrand, P.: Legal Tradition in Western Europe: The Limits of 
Commonality. In Transfrontier Mobility of Law (ed.: Jagtenberg, R.–Örücü, E.–de Roo, 
A.). The Hague–London–Boston, 1995. 63–84 and How to Compare Now. Legal Studies 16 
(1996), 232 et seq.; similarly Paasilehto, S.: Legal Cultural Obstacles to the Harmonisation 
of European Private Law. In: Function and Future of European Law, 99 and Bussani, M.: 
»Integrative« Comparative Law Enterprises and the Inner Stratification of Legal Systems. 
In: Feiden, C.–Schmid (ed.): European Review of Public Law 8 (2000), 57 et seq., 
especially at 85. 
 According to several opinions [e.g., Flume, W.: Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung. 
Zeitschrift für Insolvenz- und Wirtschaftsrecht (2000), 1427 et seq., especially at 1429, as 
well as Collins, H.: European Private Law and the Cultural Identity of States. European Review 
of Public Law 3 (1955), 353], national legal arrangements with their codal expression are 
parts of the cultural heritage anyway, whereby they, being cultural monuments, can hardly 
be relinquished by any state without simultaneously giving up something of own statal 
identity. 
 For instance, Mengoni, L.: L’Europa dei codici o un codice per l’Europa? (Roma, 
Centro di studi e ricerche di diritto comparato e straniero, 1993), 3 [Saggi, conferenze e 
seminari 7] excludes unification through codification from the circle of possible alternatives: 
“reconoscere che l’un codice per l’Europa non è un’alternativa realistica”. Legrand, P.: 
Brèves réflexions sur l’utopie unitaire en droit. Revue de la common law 3 (2000) 1–2, 
111–125 quotes from the work of P. d’Oribane Cultures et mondialisation (Paris, 1998), 
324–325, according to which “The reason according to the taste of the French is more 
noble, more devoted to the beauty of theory, more attached to the pure and gratuitous 
things, more based on general systems and ideas, more brilliant, more abundant in elegant 
demonstrations, and more sharing the characteristics of grandeur than the English do”. 
 48 Partsch, J.: Vom Beruf des römischen Rechts in der heutigen Universität. Bonn, 
1920. 50 pp. at 39, as well as Dawson, J. Ph.: The Oracles of the Law (Ann Arbor, 1968), 
432, quoted, among others, by Zimmermann, R.: Roman Law, Contemporary Law, European 
Law The Civilian Tradition Today (Oxford, 2001) xx + 197 pp.  
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“these peculiarities and jagged edges, on both sides of the Channel, are in a 
process of being with away”49). Or, what is wanted is a disillusioning cold 
voice that would neither applaud, nor oppose, just remind us that, given the 
second millennium elapsed in European history, what has happened until now 
is not too much and not necessarily new either. Therefore, one can state that 
 
“To conclude on that basis that the common law is being »Europeanised« is 
probably as rash as to imagine that it was ever isolated in the first place.”50 
 
And indeed, we cannot be so oblivious as to forget that, just a few decades 
ago, the very idea of applying any universal abstract formulation, such as in 
case of the direct and uniform judicial enforcement of transnational human 
rights charters, had filled the House of Lords with dread. Similarly, English 
lawyers have proved to be unable or unwilling to propose (perhaps out of 
pretension) a means more suitable for the internal division of their own law 
than factual classification (i.e., the one arranging facts according to the initials 
of their English names);51 acknowledging with complacency that human mind 
has never produced and could probably never produce anything more fitting 
than the purely alphabetical “chaos with an index”52 of the words identifying 




Now, looking back from the coming future to the past, what is codification of 
the various historical epochs like in the mirror of analyses by recent literature? 
As far as the early occurrences preceding the Greek and Roman codal forms 
are concerned, it is ascertained that they were, for the most part, not normative 
  
 49 Zimmermann, R.: Savigny’s Legacy: Legal History, Comparative Law, and the 
Emergence of a European Legal Science. The Law Quarterly Review 112 (October 1996), 
576–605, especially at 590 and quotation on 589. 
 50 Lewis, X.: The Europeanisation of the Common Law. In: Transfrontier Mobility of 
Law, 47–61, quotation on 61. 
 51 The aim of The Division and Classification of the Law (ed.: Jolowicz, J. A.) is 
admittedly nothing less than “A plea for a factual classification of the law […] a factual 
division of the content of the law” (7). The situation has not changed since. As Bernard 
Rudden states in his Torticles. Tulane Civil Law Forum (1991–1992) 105, “the alphabet is 
virtually the only instrument of intellectual order of which the common law makes use”. 
 52 The expression of Sir Thomas Holland is quoted by Marsh, N. in International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 30 (1981), 488. 
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sources of law53 but “pious hopes and moral resolve rather than effective 
law”54 or, at times, simply traditional literary compendia used for the official 
training of clerks,55 which could of course serve also as reference manuals for 
the judges faced with troublesome cases.56 
 It is surprising how early the idea of order arose, so to say contemporarily 
with Justinian, but thousands of miles further, also in the West.57 And in 
conceptual arrangement, substantive regulation is the first to get separated 
  
 53 “Neither in the prologues nor in the epilogues nor elsewhere do the law-codes order 
any one to observe their provisions. Judgments in lawsuites pay no regard to the law-
codes.” Walther, A.: Das altbabylonische Gerichtswesen. Leipzig, 1917. 227. Also cf., in 
the same sense, Landsberger, B.: Die babylonischen Termini für Gesetz und Recht. SDIOP 
II, 221–222. 
 54 Finkelstein, J. J.: Ammi-Saduya’s Edict and the Babylonian »Law Codes«. Journal 
of Cuneiform Studies 15 (1961), 91–104. “Their primary purpose was to lay before the 
public, posterity, future kings, and, above all, the gods, evidence of the king’s execution 
of his divinely ordained mandate.” (103) Accordingly [as Oppenheim, A. L.: Ancient 
Mesopotamia Portrait of a Dead Civilization, rev. ed. (1977) states], Hammurapi’s code 
(similarly to all former Accadian and Sumerian codifications) has no connection whatso-
ever with the legal practice of the age. Its contents can, from several main perspectives, be 
regarded rather as a traditional literary formulation of the King’s social obligations and as 
the expression of the King’s awareness of the differences between the existing and the 
desirable state of affairs. (And it is to be remembered that this edition also remarks in 
notes–rather thought-provokingly for the understanding of the all-European development–
that the fatal approach trying to squeeze reality into a series of formal requirements is 
unknown in Mesopotamia and probably also in the entire ancient Near East. It was only a 
later and definitely peripheric development, notably, Judaism [having originated from the 
desire to generate, due to certain ideological motives, specific social relationships] that 
managed to bring about such a behavioural pattern.) 
 55 Oppenheim, A. L.: Ancient Mesopotamia. Chicago, 1964. 14–21. 
 56 Westbrook, R.: Biblical and Cuneiform Law Codes. [Revue Biblique 92 (1985), 247–
264] In Folk Law Essays in the Theory and Practice of Lex Non Scripta (eds. Dundes 
Renteln, A.–Dundes, A.). New York–London, 1994. 495–511, especially at p. 503. For the 
entirety of these early forms, see also Sealey, R.: The Justice of the Greeks (Ann Arbor, 
1994). 
 57 Notably, it appears already as a programme in title 1 of the book II of the version of 
the unified (Visigothic and Roman) code of Recceswinth (654) as amended by Erwig (681) 
that the law-book has to provide “a clear and honest meaning, expressing clear precepts for 
the doubtful […] in orderly arrangement […] in ordered titles”. Quoted by Fischer Drew, K.: 
The Barbarian Kings as Lawgivers and Judges, in her Law and Society in Early Medieval 
Europe Studies in Legal History. London, 1988. 7–29 and 15. 
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from procedural and evidentiary rules in early compilations, so that it can 
finally be declared: 
 
“all questions for which there is no regulation have to be answered upon the 
basis of the regulation given in the law. […] The law becomes, out of 
something inherent in the things, a kind of order posited above the things, 
an autonomous power.”58 
New realisations are now made available about the substitutes for codification 
from antiquity up to the present day. On the one hand, we not only learn how 
widespread it was for official compilations to enter into effect in form of 
manuscripts (either due to lack of printing press or to some local custom), but 
there were even times when they were expressly designed to be made public by 
way of being deposited (for example, at the Town Hall in case of the Coutumes 
de la ville d’Ypres, 1535) as accessible to anyone to ask for a copy on payment 
of a certain amount,59 just as the Icelandic law-speaker [lögsögumaður] centuries 
earlier (back in the age of the Konungsbók [Codex regius], 930–1262) could be 
approached to reassert occasionally for those who looked after justice, what the 
law was.60 On the other hand, not only revealed holy books (like, e.g., the Bible 
for the first founders of the state of Massachusetts) can provide a rudimentary 
guidance as the law’s summation but, at times and for want of anything better, 
  
 58 [“alle nichtgeregelten Fragen sich aus der im Gesetz gegebenen Regelung beantworten 
lassen müssen. […] Das Recht (Gesetz) wird aus einer den Dingen innewohnenden eine über 
die Dinge gesetzte Ordnung, eine autonome Macht”] Ebel, W.: Geschichte der Gesetzgebung 
in Deutschland. Göttingen, 1958. 107 pp. [Göttinger rechtswissenschaftliche Studien 24], on 
75. According to his examples, such is the promulgation of a Gerichtsordnung und 
Landrecht, auch Polizei-, Holz-, Hütten-, Bergordnung und Reformation (1592) on the 
estate of Wildenburg a. d. Sieg or of a Rechtsordnung consisting of 16 titles (1663) as 
based upon the reformation of the Bericht über Erbfälle und über etliche Mißbräuch on the 
estate of Kurköln (1538) (73); and, as a conceptual systematisation, the issuance of a 
Gerichts- und Landordnung (verf. Joh. Fichard, 1571) in the county Solms and, as parts of 
it, a Von den Landrechten (with 32 titles) and a Von Gerichten und gerichtlichem  Prozeß 
(with 40 titles) (74). 
 59 E.g., the Statutes of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (1529), as well as the Sud’ebniks 
of the Grand Duchy of Moscow (1497 & 1550). Cf. Uruszczak, W.: Les codes de droit en 
Europe à l’époque de la renaissance. In: La codification européenne du Moyen-Age au 
siècle des Lumières (éd. Salmonowicz, S.). Warszawa, 1997. 69–102, especially at 101. 
 60 Sigurđur L.: Law and Legislation in the Icelandic Commonwealth. Scandinavian 
Studies in Law 37 Stockholm, 1993. 55–92. 
 CODIFICATION ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE THIRD MILLENNIUM 109 
  
 
maybe even practical guidebooks, written originally for didactic purposes to 
students.61 
 Well, especially in case of the great oeuvres marking the emergence of the 
classical type of codification (like, e.g., the Allgemeines Landrecht62 and the Code 
civil), despite the former’s authoritarian and the latter’s revolutionary origin,63 
their one-time embeddedness in traditions64 is increasingly re-discovered and 
emphasised now, especially in the light of today’s intellectual and institutional 
  
 61 The Hexabiblos (1345), compiled by the Thessalonian learned specialist Constantine 
Harmenopoulos and usually referred to as the “miserable epitome of epitomes of the 
epitomes”, was applied throughout the late Middle Ages as a substitute source of the law in 
Greece and the entire Balkans. What is more, it was even confirmed by an order of 
February 23, 1835, of the Kingdom of Greece so that, in lack of any custom or judicial 
practice to the contrary, it had to be applied as a general source of the law until a civil code 
was finally drafted (which was actually done as late as on February 23, 1946). Or, in 
South-Africa, the Thirty-three Articles that constitutionally established Transvaal had 
stipulated in section 31 that ‘hollandsche wet’ had to be taken as the basis of the law. The 
new Constitution (Grondwet, September 19, 1859) defined, in Annex [bijlage] 1, first 
Johannes van der Linden’s Rechtsgeleerd practicaal en koopmans Handboek, secondly 
Simon van Leeuwen’s Het Roomsch-hollandsche recht and thirdly Grotius Inleidinge tot de 
hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid (1631) to serve as its framework. That is, it ordained 
practical handbooks published in a wide circulation during the 17th century as the basic 
reference to law in the second half of the 19th century despite the fact that the new civil 
code of the Netherlands (Burgerlijk wetboek, 1838) had by then left the old law for decades 
behind, as a sheer preliminary. Watson, 20 and 19. 
 62 According to Stein, P.: Roman Law in European History (Cambridge, 1999), 112, 
the main drafter of the Allgemeines Landrecht was Carl Gottlieb Suarez who shared the 
views of Christian Wolff, in terms of which it is the ruler’s duty to guide his subjects to 
lead a perfectly reasonable life. Therefore, the Prussian Code had to have an educational 
purpose and, as addressed to the public, it had to be comprehensive, clear and definite as 
well. 
 63 According to the witty remark of Domenico Corradini Garantismo e statualismo Le 
codificazioni civilistiche dell’Ottocento (Milano, 1971), 12 et seq. [Pubblicazioni della 
Facoltà di Giurisprudenza della Università di Pisa 39], the classical codes were originally 
drafted with the purpose of safeguarding either absolutism or basic freedoms. At the same 
time, Halpérin, J.-L.: L’impossible Code civil. Paris, 1992. 309 pp. [Histoires] points out 
that all the natural law, colouring the French Civil code, only served to conceal the novelty 
of its wording (289), while “the text finally adopted after struggles of nearly one and a 
half decade was the longest among all the proposals yet at the same time the least 
revolutionary.” (287) 
 64 Gordley, J.: Myths of the French Civil Code. The American Journal of Comparative 
Law 42 (1994), 459 et seq. 
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challenges that, as driven by a common “European interest” or under simple 
pressure of time and out of helplessness, look back rather on Savigny instead 
of Thibaut.65 This is all the more remarkable because it appeared as the practical 
correction of the cardinal idea of the Enlightenment (namely, the ideals of 
rationality, logicality and universality66 that once resulted in the emergence of 
the new, quality type of codification and which ideals were once believed to 
have absolute validity) at a time when all these revolutionary illusions, wish-
dreams and incantations had to be put to the test of life by being implemented 
in practice. 
 Thus, it is no mere chance that Portalis’ personal contribution to the drafting 
of the Code civil has now (in contrast to the disdainful tone once used when 
remembering him67) come to the limelight with the effect of revelation (revoking 
his bitter and disillusioned treatise with a non-mainstream picture of his age, once 
considered worthy of oblivion). Secondly, it is little wonder that it is through the 
interpretation of the Code Napoléon as a sociological phenomenon that we now 
start collecting the following facts about J. E. M. Portalis (1746–1807) as features 
determining his personality: He fled to Northern Germany during the Revolution, 
where he got into contact with Pietists; his attraction to the oeuvres of Pascal 
and Montesquieu deepened; it was also during that period that he started to 
castigate the one-time misery of his homeland in an essay only posthumously 
published. For in Germany, as he wrote, he had seen the materialisation of the 
good form of what he called esprit philosophique: small universities, closed 
  
 65 Thibaut, A. F. J.: Über die Nothwendigkeit eines allgemeinen bürgerlichen Rechts 
in Deutschland (Heidelberg, 1814) and von Savigny, F. C.: Von Beruf unserer Zeit für 
Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (Heidelberg, 1814), both reprinted in Thibaut und 
Savigny Ihre programmatische Schriften (hrsg.: Hattenhauer, H.). München, 1973. 61 et 
seq. as well as 95 et seq. As to the movement and their debates, cf. Wrobel. H.: Die 
Kontroverse Thibaut–Savigny im Jahre 1814 und ihre Deutung in der Gegenwart [Diss.]. 
(Bremen, 1975) v + 307 pp. 
 66 “A well conducted government must have a system as coherent as a system of 
philosophy, so that finance, police, and the army are coordinated to the same end, namely 
the consolidation of the state and the increase of its power. Such a system can only emanate 
from a single brain, that of the sovereign.” Andrews, S.: Eighteenth-century Europe. London, 
1965. 119. And, as Finer, S. E.: The History of Government From the Earliest Times, I–III 
(Oxford, 1997), 1456 continues this line of thought, showing the parallel between the great 
epochs of governmental bureaucracy and codification (1458), all this preconditions “belief 
in uniformities in Nature, the logicality of Reason, and correspondingly, the need to 
rationalize, systematize, and codify the laws under which subjects were to live.” 
 67 E.g., Planiol, M. : Traité élémentaire de droit civil I. Paris, 1900. § 80: “n’a point 
dépassé la médiocrité”. 
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intellectual circles without any major social or political irradiation, where ideas 
were not driven by the chance of materialisation, thus being unable to become 
directly dangerous either. The French Revolution had, on the other hand, 
originated from the salons of Paris, as launched by the “Sophists”. The whole 
atmosphere of the Enlightenment in France with direct irradiation of ideas and 
mobilisation of the political elite itself, focussing on the idea of a mentally 
anticipated conceptual system with the urge of its systemic implementation, was 
suitable to tempt to both irresponsibility and extreme consistency, and, once 
inflicted on the Nation as a living practice, it might also elicit the eventual 
(ill)fortune of a whole country. Well, such a cry in Portalis’ complaints68 may 
remind the reader of present-day criticisms of the wantonly useless, bare 
intellectualism marking our modernity.69 Accordingly, 
  
 68 “How much we could have benefited since, if the idea of system had not thrown 
pernicious errors into the most useful truths, and if the wise lessons of experience had not 
been suffocated by exaggerated and absurd theories!” “It was the men of genius, of 
character and of vision, and not the Sophists who founded societies, built cities, and taught 
things to peoples. Sophists always appear at times when morals are corrupted. They are 
born therefrom and they are hardly suitable to raise, with their miserable influence, those 
spirits and hearts degraded. As soon as they formulate an idea, they believe to have brought 
about a kind of institution. But, as the ideas formulated do not, by themselves, capture people, 
they do neither take roots where they were sown. They just keep multiplying the laws, whereby 
they exactly achieve the debasement of legislation. And meanwhile everything gets lost: 
the false philosophical mind is like a deaf shell enclosing everything.” Portalis, J. E. M.: 
De l’usage et de l’abus de l’esprit philosophique durant le XVIII
e
 siècle [Paris, 1820] 3
e
 éd. 
(Paris, 1834), 300–301 and 402–403, with a selected reprint in Portalis, J. E. M.: Écrits et 
discours juridique et politique. (Aix-Marseille: Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, 
1988), 227 and 398–399. 
 69 For present-day stands about intellectualism, see Kiáltás gyakorlatiasságért a 
jogállami átmenetben [A call for practicality in the transition to rule of law] (ed. Varga, 
Cs.). Budapest, 1998. 122 pp. especially with Kirckpatrick, J. J.: Introduction to her 
Dictatorship and Double Standards Rationalism and Reason in Politics (New York, 
1982), 1–18 and, as a stand taken by the author, A racionális jogszemlélet eredendő 
ambivalenciája: Emberi teljességünk széttörése a fejlődés áraként? [The inherent 
ambivalence of a rational legal approach: development at the price of the fragmentation 
of our human integrity?] In: A jogtudomány és a büntetőjog dogmatikája, filozófiája 
Tanulmánykönyv Békés Imre születésének 70. évfordulójára [Philosophy of law and penal 
law: Festschrift for Professor Imre Békés] (eds. Busch, B.–Belovics, E.–Tóth, D.). 
Budapest, 2000. 270–277 as well as Önmagát felemelő ember? Korunk racionalizmusának 
dilemmái [Man elevating himself? Dilemmas of rationalism in our age]. In: Sodródó 
emberiség [Mankind adrift: on the work of Nándor Várkonyi’s The Fifth Man] ed.: Mezey, 
K. (Budapest, 2000), 61–93. In a philosophical and socio-theoretical context, cf. also 




“Portalis may have arrived at the philosophical conviction of empiricism 
transformed into philosophy. This knows no system, only adaptation, that 
is, the adaptability of thought to the different requirements of the moment.”70 
 
To recognise again the moment of tradition embodied (among others) by the 
French revolutionary breakthrough in codification, as well as that of experience 
indispensable beyond reason and logic in the judicial profession, or to re-
consider the debates revolving around codification having called to life the 
historical school of law in Germany from the second half of the 18th century 
on, well, all this cannot at all be alone attributed to an immanent interest in the 
history of ideas today. After all, we have to find fixed points that help us 
identify the paths of the future. More precisely, it is exactly the path to be 
followed in the near future about which we think we may ascertain that its 
uniqueness and the unprecedentedness of its venture are nothing but the 
extension, in European dimensions and with an all-European complexity, of 
the difficult and risky decision which had already been faced once at a national 
level in Germany of the 19th century, and for the intellectual dilemma of which 
perhaps the one-time movement of the German historical school of law can 
now be taken as the best example.71 
 Anyway, the recognition according to which the age of the series of pieces 
of national codification was limited in a social and political sense as well, as it 
embodied and emphasised a further stage of universal development, is reflected 
by the historical reconstruction of the birth of the Austrian Allgemeines Bürger-
liches Gesetzbuch. For, according to its monographer, 
 
“the codification of civil law was an attempt to reconcile the modern notion 
of the state as the supreme public authority holding a monopoly of govern-
ment with the idea of the rule of law as an objective and, indeed, absolute 
category of social cohesion, and as such not subject to the supreme will 
of public authority […]. On the Continent of Europe, codified civil law 
provided the legal basis for the social and political pattern of the nineteenth 
                                                      
Hayek és a brit felvilágosodás A konstruktivista gondolkodás kritikája [Hayek and the 
British Enlightenment: criticism of the constructivist thought] ed. Ferenc Horkay Hörcher. 
Budapest, 2002. [Jogfilozófiák]. 
 70 Carbonnier, J.: Le Code Napoléon en tant que phénomène sociologique. Revue de la 
Recherche juridique Droit prospectif (1981) 335. 
 71 Cf., especially, Zimmermann: Roman Law…, op. cit. 14–17. 
 CODIFICATION ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE THIRD MILLENNIUM 113 
  
 
and early twentieth centuries: the state of absolute sovereignty which yet 
remained a Rechtsstaat”.72 
 
At the time and under the given circumstances, this reconstructive requirement 
of the codal function had completely fulfilled what I had, in the monograph 
referred to above, described as the main (socio-legal) function of the national 
unification of law, on the one hand, and the apparently merely legal-technical 
function of the centralised state domination over the law, on the other, in terms 
of which the state may, in turn, control the entire theoretical and practical staff 
of the law and, thereby, decisively shape its everyday implementation as well.73 
 How far has the fulfilment of such major vocations and expectations 
progressed, as assessed by critical retrospection within a present perspective? 
 
“Obviously, some of the high hopes and expectations entertained at the time 
of the Enlightenment have not been fulfilled: neither have the codifications 
made the learned lawyer redundant, nor have they led to a lasting consoli-
dation (or, to put it negatively: ossification) of private law. Still, however, 
they have significantly contributed towards the national fragmentation of 
the European legal tradition.”74 
 
Well, the realisation above may serve as a typical illustration of how certain 
evaluations can turn into their own opposite, depending on the historical evolution 
and practical developments, for, in the light of the present-day international 
process of unification in European proportions, that what once (just one or two 
centuries ago) was a landmark of the national legal unification is now (and not 
without any foundation) re-formulated as national fragmentation. Just as 
paradoxical is the following statement by the same historian of European law, 
well versed in deepened English legal studies, according to which 
 
“What German arms had achieved on the battlefields of France–political 
unity–had now also been peacefully accomplished in the area of private 
law: »One People. One Empire. One Law.«”75 
  
 72 Strakosch, H. E.: State Absolutism and the Rule of Law The Struggle for the 
Codification of Civil Law in Austria, 1753–1811. (Sydney, 1967) vii + 267 pp. 
 73 See Varga Codification…, op. cit. passim. 
 74 Zimmermann: Roman Law…, op. cit. 1. 
 75 Ibid., 53, quoting Zittelmann, E.: Zur Begründung des neuen Gesetzbuches. Deutsche 
Juristenzeitung (1900), 2. Moreover, Windscheid, B.: Das römische Recht in Deutschland. In 




Indeed, the requirement of both the overall popular knowledge of the law and 
regulatory completeness is not any longer featuring amongst the classical 
dreams and hopes regarding codification, or at least, not in the sense of the 
law’s easy accessibility, cognisability and manageability.76 Therefore, the 
dream originating from the age of the Enlightenment, postulating that society 
and law have to be established in one consciously planned and realised act 
around which the real life would revolve as planets of the solar system, turned 
out to be quite irrealistic.77 
                                                      
his Gesammelte Reden und Abhandlungen (hrsg. Oertmann, P.). Leipzig–Duncker–
Humblot, 1904. 48 desired the same: to provide “a German law for the German People” by 
building up “a cathedral of national splendour”, a wish common to Europe as an objective 
of all the national states from the age of Napoleon. Cf., e.g., von Görres, J. in Rheinisches 
Merkur (April 7, 1815): “Ein Reich, ein Recht!” a quote by Gaudemet, J. in his La 
codification, ses formes et ses fins. Revue juridique et politique Indépendance et 
coopération 40 (Janvier–Juin 1986) 3–4, 239–260, especially 257. It may seem ironic, yet 
can perhaps be explained by the historical conditions of contemporary criticism that the 
first draft of the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (1888) as characterised by Zimmermann: 
ibid.) “was condemned as being too abstract and pedantic, it was denounced as a pandectist 
textbook cast in statutory form and thus as being too unGerman; it was attacked as being 
out of touch with the realities of life and as lacking even a drop of socialist oil.” Cf. also 
Varga: Codification…, op. cit. 135, note 84. 
 76 “Today, one has given up all hope that the average citizen can be expected to 
comprehend the law. […] A code may or may not be desirable: that it fails to promote 
general knowledge of the law cannot be regarded as a decisive argument within this 
debate.” Zimmermann: Codification…, op. cit. 108. 
 77 The Hegelian parallel–“Never since the sun has stood in the firmament and the 
planets revolved around it had it been perceived that man’s existence centres in his head, 
i.e. in thought, inspired by which he builds up the world of reality.” Hegel, G. W. F.: The 
Philosophy of History (Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte [1840] IV 
Berlin, 1970–1976. 926), 447, quoted by Varga: Codification…, op. cit. 302–is translated 
by Gambaro, 81, into a description of the doctrine of legal sources when he recalls: in the 
19th century, “the so-called special statutes [were relegated] to the level of exceptional norms 
which rotated around the code, just as the planets of the solar system move around the sun”. 
It is this same sense in which the root of the present decline of codification is seen by Irti, 
27: “The Codice civile cannot be recognised as having […] the value of general law, 
the seat of principles that are set forth and »specified« by external laws […]. [For it] 
functions henceforth as a »residual law«, as a discipline for cases not regulated by 
particular provisions.” 
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 The wish-dream of both total systemicity78  and gaplessness,79 effecting 
comprehensive and exhaustive regulation on principle, has proved to be a 
similarly vain hope, and even more so the attempt at enforcing this through the 
prohibition of judicial interpretation.80 Well, all these new developments are 
definitely meant to reaffirm the trust to be placed necessarily by the legislator 
in those who administer justice,81 as a reminder of the gradual construction of 
the law and the inevitable division of law-making contribution,  covering all 
stages of the entire process of the law’s formation, by conceptualising them as 
“the two-graded process of the law’s establishment” (to use the expression of 
Kelsen having written his second major treatise in 1922),82 on the one hand, 
and they also reaffirm the function of the code which I had earlier characterized 
(in describing the life, posterior to the Second World War, of the Code civil 
and other classical codes) in a way that, in the process of the gradual building 
up of jurisprudence through merely referring to the code-text in the everyday 
practical development of the law, the code’s genuine function gets reduced to 
nothing but providing and indicating systemic-taxonomic locuses for the judicial 
solution of the case, that is, to a most relative guidance by far not unambiguous 
or excluding alternatives, on the other.83 
  
 78 “If you read the proceedings, you may be amused at finding the briskest of all the 
debate took place over the two little words »and hares« in a section relating to damage 
done by wild animals. Powerful language is used, and, for a moment, the given whole of the 
mighty project seem to be endangered by the conflicting interests of sport and agriculture. 
That is the touch of humour, required as a relief for so much civil virtue.”–wrote Maitland, 
F. W.: The Making of the German Civil Code. In: his The Collected Papers (ed. Fisher, H.) 
III Cambridge, 1911. 482, declaring thereby that this was nevertheless the victory of the 
whole over each and all its individual components. 
 79 Cf., e.g., Hübner, H.: Kodifikation und Entscheidungsfreiheit des Richters in der 
Geschichte des Privatrechts. Königstein, 1980. 74. [Beiträge zur neueren Privatrechts-
geschichte 8]. 
 80 For Frederick the Great [Publikationspatent (1794), art. XVIII], judges are prohibited 
“to indulge in any arbitrary deviation, however slight, from the clear and express terms of 
the laws, whether on the grounds of some allegedly logical reasoning or under the pretext 
of an interpretation based on the supposed aim and purpose of the statutes”. 
 81 The necessary failure that can be traced back throughout our known history is 
described by Becker, H.-J.: Kommentier- und Auslegungsverbot. In: Handwörterbuch zur 
Deutschen Rechtsgeschichte (hrsg. Erler, A.–Kaufmann, E.–Stammler, W.) II. Berlin, 
1978. 963 et seq. 
 82 Kelsen, H.: Allgemeine Staatslehre. Wien, 1922. 
 83 And this was already a total shift, equal to giving up the original function which had 
once historically brought the phenomenon known as codification, because thereby the code 
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 Thereby, methodologically we have returned to the expectations towards a 
common European codification of private law, to the possible methodology of 
its realisation and to the formulation of the main function to be filled by it. 
Accordingly, 
 
“a codification […] provides a system that all those who have to apply and 
interpret the law to see »varitat[es] inter se connexa[e]«84 to appreciate 
and pay attention to the normative context within which a specific decision 
has to be seen, to avoid inconsistencies and to arrive at solutions that are 
not only fair and equitable per se but also fit in with the solutions found to 
other problems. […] It provides a focus which enables him to relate 
seemingly disparate issues to each other and harmoniously to incorporate 
new strands of thought.”85 
 
Everything considered, what underlies the above statement is nothing else than 
the replacement of the idea of a system, closed into its axiomatic self, by the 
idea of a half-open and half-closed autopoietic system that shuts itself back 
and also re-generates itself each time it closes itself, utilising any of its original 
systemic definitions in any way only when it is closed back in practice and, 
therefore, changing its definitions and contextualisations any time it operates, 
depending on its given environment. Methodologically speaking, something 
similar may have been in mind after the Second World War was over, when 
the claim for “a natural law with changing contents” (as formulated by Rudolf 
Stammler after the First World War) became filled with concrete contents. As 
concluded by a contemporary author, 
 
“The eternal truths to be found in the sphere of the logic of things […] do 
not constitute a closed system as once supposed by natural law, but arrive 
at various aspects through the entire material of the law, connected with 
powerful linkages to the decisions here and now to be made.”86 
 
                                                      
fell back from the codal role of determining the law to the mere role of indicating the mere 
systemic loci of the practical (judicial) shaping of the law. Cf. Varga: Codification…, op. 
cit. especially ch. V, para. 5. 
 84 Wolff, Ch.: Institutes juris naturae et gentium, § 62. 
 85 Zimmermann: Codification... op. cit. 110. 
 86 Welzel, H.: Naturrecht und materielle Gerechtigkeit. Göttingen, 1951. 198. 
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With this, one has also formulated the new creed of the judicial profession in 
the light of the new, present-day conditions of codification. For 
 
“difficult problems can simply be wrongly analysed because, without 
conceptual discipline, it is not possible to be sure that previous cases were 
indeed like the one now before the court. The elementary principle of formal 
justice, that like cases be decided alike, is thus offended. Again, whole areas 
of the law can be neglected if in the absence of a map nobody can see that 
they are being insufficiently visited […]. There is also another kind of 
damage at a higher level, in that, in the absence of a common conceptual 
structure, lawyers loose faith in the rationality of their endeavour […]. It is 
perhaps the most important feature to be kept in mind: a code has to be 
brought to life, and has to be kept in tune with the changing demands of 
time by active and imaginative judicial interpretation and doctrinal elabo-





The lesson to be securely drawn is that notwithstanding the untroubled 
pursuance of domestic practice, we are getting closer to a crossroads. The 
perspective of the common codification of private law within the European 
Union not only brings back (breaking through walls of silence of several 
centuries) memories of accomplishments and expectations of a long and distant 
past (once made universally valid in continental dimensions) as actual experience, 
but, at the same time, also refers us back to those points and moments (regarded 
for centuries as buried by the bygone past) from which, upon the basis of the 
joint acquisition of the shared Greek-Roman heritage and its differentiating 
(yet in a way somehow united) re-adaptation, the paths of development 
characteristic of the Civil Law and the Common Law started once to diverge. 
 The more the advancement of the European unification progresses, the 
more inverse the assessment of European codification becomes, reconsidering 
past trends, values and regulatory techniques. Thus, it is suggested as if we, on 
the Continent, had not so much become statal national units unified by a sequence 
  
 87 Zimmermann: op. cit. 114. See also in a similar sense Kötz, H.: Taking Civil Codes 
Less Seriously. Modern Law Review 50 (1987), 13 et seq. and Birk, P.: The Need for the 
Institutes in England. Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte Romanistische 
Abteilung, 108 (1991), 708 et seq. 
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of national laws but, being too conceited of our most promising collective 
heritage within the transitory phase of an infantile disorder, became rather 
fragmented in national isolation from one another. The meaning conveyed by 
our past and the paths actually covered have thereby become dubious again 
with open-ending alternatives. 
 The problem of codification in Europe seemed to be more or less settled for 
ever a few decades ago. Now, in the light of the new challenges that are coming 
from the facts of the newest European convergence, we have to resume not 
only our earlier investigations but, at the same time, also repeatedly re-consider 
the foundations and the historical (that is, as directed from the past towards the 
future, perspectivical) presuppositions of our thinking, perhaps not for the last 
time in our ever-changing world. 
 
 
 
 
 
